KonAspen lends against real estate. We write private, real-estate-secured notes for sponsors and borrowers who need capital faster or more flexibly than a bank will move, and we fund that lending with a preferred debt pool built for accredited investors. Our founder built a $50M private-credit facility and ran a debt fund before he ever swung a hammer, so the discipline behind every loan is a credit desk's, not a broker's: price the risk into the basis, secure the collateral, and get paid to be patient.
We underwrite each loan the way a lender should. Before we talk rate or term, we look at the collateral: what the property is worth today, what it will be worth after the plan is executed, and what it would clear in a quick sale if the plan slips. The loan sizes to that basis, not to a borrower's optimism. If the numbers only work when everything goes right, we pass.
In practice that means three values sit on the page for every request. The as-is value is what the asset would sell for today, untouched. The as-repaired value is what it should bring once the business plan is finished, supported by real comparable sales rather than a hoped-for ceiling. And the liquidation value is the honest number: what the collateral would clear if it had to sell quickly, with a broker motivated to move it. We size the note so that even the liquidation case protects principal, which is why our loan amounts sit below what an aggressive lender would offer against the same property.
That work is easier because we operate in the same markets we lend in. KonAspen invests, develops, and renovates across the Kansas City metro, with a concentration in Johnson County's move-up submarkets. We have carried our own renovations from purchase to exit, so when a sponsor hands us a scope of work and a comp set, we read it as an operator, not a spreadsheet. We know where a budget is thin, where a timeline is fantasy, and where an exit price is real. We have lived on both sides of the loan, which is why a thin budget or a fantasy timeline rarely gets past us.
We lend across the capital stack, and the right instrument depends on where a deal actually needs help. A first-position bridge loan is the workhorse: it sits senior to everything else, carries a project through acquisition and renovation, and is repaid when a sale or a permanent refinance takes us out. Because it holds the first claim on the collateral, it is the most conservative position we lend from, and it is where most of our capital goes.
Mezzanine and second-lien notes sit behind a senior lender and fill the gap between what the bank will fund and what the sponsor can bring to the table. A borrower who has a bank loan covering seventy percent of a project but needs another slice to close can use a second-lien note to bridge that space rather than surrendering equity in the deal. The trade is straightforward: a subordinate position carries more risk than a first lien, so it prices higher, and we size it with even more room to spare because we are standing behind another lender's claim.
Choosing among these is a question of what problem the sponsor is solving. Speed and certainty of close point to a first-position bridge. A thin equity check against an otherwise-bankable deal points to mezzanine or second-lien fill. We would rather write the position that genuinely fits than talk a borrower into a structure that looks cheaper on the term sheet and costs them later.
Structure is where our credit background shows. A plain note carries an interest rate and a term, and for many deals that is exactly right. But some projects justify a structure that shares outcome as well as risk, and that is where our experience running a 2-and-20 debt fund earns its keep.
Our note on the 3215 project is a useful example of the shape these can take: a floor return in the low double digits paired with a share of the deal's profit. The lender earns a defined base regardless, and participates in the upside if the project performs. It is one way to align a lender with a sponsor without turning a loan into equity, and it lets us price patient capital fairly for both sides. The borrower keeps control of the project and the bulk of the upside; the lender accepts a modest coupon in exchange for a slice of the reward, which lowers the cash cost of the loan while the work is underway.
Every note is negotiated to the specific collateral, position, and business plan in front of us. Term length is matched to the plan, not to a standard calendar, so a nine-month flip and a two-year ground-up carry different clocks. We define the default remedies and the payoff mechanics in plain language up front. The 3215 structure is an illustration of what is possible, not a standard term sheet, and no two of our notes read exactly alike.
A private loan is only as good as its administration, so we run ours with the same discipline we bring to underwriting. After a term sheet is agreed, we confirm the collateral through appraisal or our own comparable analysis, verify title and lien position, and document the business plan the loan is funding. Nothing about that process is meant to slow a deal down; it is meant to make sure both sides know exactly what secures the note before money moves.
For loans that fund a renovation or a build, capital is typically released against a draw schedule rather than handed over at once. Funds are advanced as work is completed and verified, which keeps the outstanding balance tied to real progress and protects both the borrower's carrying cost and the lender's collateral. It is the same draw discipline we use on our own projects, and it is one more reason operating experience makes us better lenders.
We also plan for the case where a plan slips, because in real estate some of them do. A timeline can run long, a market can soften for a quarter, a payoff can arrive late. Because we size every loan below what the collateral can absorb and underwrite the liquidation case from the start, we have room to work with a borrower who hits a delay rather than reaching immediately for a remedy. That margin of safety is what lets us be patient when patience is the right answer, and firm when it is not.
Our borrowers are sponsors and operators with a real asset and a clear plan: a value-add buyer who needs to close before a bank can, a builder bridging a construction draw, an owner who needs flexible capital against equity that is already in the ground. We are most useful when speed, certainty of close, and a lender who understands the asset matter more than the lowest possible coupon. A bank will usually win on rate; we win on how quickly and how confidently we can close, and on a payoff process run by people who know what the borrower is actually building.
The best fits tend to share a few traits. There is real collateral with a defensible value, a plan we can follow and pressure-test, and an exit, whether a sale or a refinance, that does not depend on the market improving. Experienced local operators who have done the work before are easier to underwrite than first-timers, though a strong asset and a conservative basis can carry a newer sponsor.
We are direct about fit. Because we secure every loan against real property and size to a conservative basis, we are not the right call for unsecured needs or for projects where the collateral cannot support the request. When a deal does not fit, we say so early rather than string a borrower along, and we will tell a sponsor plainly when a bank is the cheaper answer for what they need.
The capital behind these notes comes from our preferred debt pool, offered to accredited investors who want exposure to real-estate-secured credit rather than the operating risk of owning and renovating property. The pool targets an 8% preferred return and sits in the debt position: paid before equity, secured by the underlying real estate, and spread across the loans we originate rather than tied to a single project's outcome. Diversifying across a book of notes, rather than a single deal, is part of how the position is built to behave more steadily than direct ownership.
Debt investors are trading upside for priority. They are not chasing the full return an equity partner might earn on a home run; they are buying a defined, senior, secured position and the discipline that stands behind it. That is a deliberate trade, and it suits investors who value a grounded, predictable role in the capital stack over the wider swing of equity. For investors who want that upside exposure instead, we also run a preferred equity pool and individual-deal offerings, described separately.
Targets are targets, not guarantees. The 8% figure describes what the debt pool aims to deliver; it is not a promise of return, and every real estate investment carries risk of loss, including loss of principal. Participation is limited to accredited investors, and the specific terms, minimums, and risks of any offering are described in its offering documents, which govern over anything summarized here.
The Kansas City metro spans two states and tends to move with less volatility than the coasts, which makes it well suited to secured lending: values are grounded in real move-up demand and strong school districts rather than speculation. That stability is only an advantage if you underwrite to it. We price risk into the basis on the way in, keep our loan amounts below what the collateral can absorb, and structure exits we would be comfortable owning ourselves if we ever had to.
The credit-desk habits carry through every step: three values on every asset, a draw schedule tied to real progress, a liquidation case run before the first dollar goes out, and a bias toward saying no when the margin of safety is not there. None of it is exotic. It is the same underwriting institutional credit desks use, applied at a local scale by people who also operate the properties.
The result is lending that is boring in the best way. Borrowers get a partner who understands the asset and can close. Investors get a secured, senior position managed by people who have run institutional credit and operated the properties themselves. Boring, in secured lending, is the whole point.
We write private, real-estate-secured notes: first-position bridge loans that carry a project through acquisition and renovation, plus mezzanine and second-lien notes that sit behind a senior lender and fill the gap between bank financing and a sponsor's equity. Every loan is secured against real property and sized to a conservative basis. The right instrument depends on where a specific deal actually needs capital.
A bank will often win on headline rate; we win on speed, certainty of close, and a payoff process run by people who have operated the same kind of asset. Because we are the decision-maker and know the local market, we can move faster than a bank on the right deal. We are direct about fit and will tell you early if a bank is the cheaper answer for what you need.
We put three values on every asset: as-is, as-repaired, and a liquidation value that reflects a quick sale. We size the note so principal is protected even in the liquidation case, which keeps our loan amounts below what an aggressive lender would offer. That built-in margin of safety is also what gives us room to work with a borrower who hits a delay rather than reaching immediately for a remedy.
The best fits have real collateral with a defensible value, a clear plan we can follow and pressure-test, and an exit, whether sale or refinance, that does not depend on the market improving. Experienced local operators are easiest to underwrite, though a strong asset and a conservative basis can carry a newer sponsor. We are not the right call for unsecured needs or for projects where the collateral cannot support the request.
The lending is funded by our preferred debt pool, offered to accredited investors who want exposure to real-estate-secured credit rather than the operating risk of owning property. The pool targets an 8% preferred return and sits in the debt position, paid before equity and secured by the underlying real estate, spread across the loans we originate. The 8% target is not a guarantee, and every real estate investment carries risk of loss, including principal.
Yes. Some projects justify a structure that pairs a defined return floor with a share of the deal's profit, as our note on the 3215 project illustrates. That structure lowers the cash cost of the loan while work is underway and aligns the lender with the sponsor without turning the loan into equity. It is one option among many; every note is negotiated to the specific collateral, position, and business plan, so no two read exactly alike.